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SOME MORAL PROBLEMS 
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Professor of Cla1ssics, 
Royal University of Malta. 
This p3per is an abridged version of the 
St. Luke's Day lecture delivered to the 
Malta Branch of the British Medical Asso-
chltion on the 18th October 1972 at the 
Medical School of the University. 
When deaHng with the moral aspects 
of transplants one has to bhink of a double 
operation, that by which the tissue or 
org.an is taken from one person, and that 
by wnich it is grafted on to another: hence 
we should consider both the receiver and 
the donor. 
As regards the receiver the doctor 
should be sure that the patient will die if 
the transplant is not made, and that, be-
sides, there is a good probability of the 
operation being successful. The surgeon 
should also have the consent of the pa-
tient, or, if he is a minor, of his parent 
(fabher) or tutor. 
As regards the donor, the transplant 
may be an autograft, or a graft from an-
other person. In the first case there 'is no 
difficulty as aB the parts of a Hving hu-
man org.anism are ordained to the benefit 
of the whole. The surgeon has only to be 
morally sure, medically, that both excision 
and graft are necessary for the patient's 
surviva'l and scientificaByHkely to be suc-
cessful (ef. Fr. Gera1d KeUy, "Notes on 
Moral Theology, 1951", in Theological 
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Studies, March, 1952, p. 60; Pius XII's Ad-
dress to the First International Congress 
of Histopathology of the Nervous System, 
September 13, 1952, in Addresses of Pope 
Pius XII, 1952, Edizione Paol1ini). 
The problems arise with grafts from 
another individual. The donor may be dead 
or aHve. In the former case the consent 
has to be given by the next of kin or the 
situation must be such that the consent 
may be legitimately presumed. Obviously 
the case 'in which it cannot be presumed 
would be when the dead donor had ex-
pressed such a refusal -in his wi,ll. StHl, 
even in such a case, if the necessity of 
saving the receiver make the measure ur-
gent and no other provision for a trans-
plant is possible, one might perhaps agree 
to presume that the dead donor would not 
have been unwilling to change his mind 
had he been sWl al'ive. 
The crucia'l problem is how to be cer-
tain that the donor is dead, because if he 
is not, even though his state is hopeless 
and it is certain that he would die very 
soon, an excision made upon him which 
terminates his l'ife is murder, The tradi-
tional definition of death used to be the 
complete and permanent cessation of res-
piration and circulation, but recent advan-
ces in chemical and electronic cardiac re-
suscitation techniques as well as the use 
of mechanical respirators have created ,a 
need for a new definition. In the case of 
death through an accident, the determining 
of death may not be difficult, for if, in that 
case, the corpse shows damages or 'lesions 
which are incompatible with life, e.g. if 
the brain is completely crushed, or the 
head cut off, it is dear that death in its 
absolute sense, 'is present. In fact, the soul 
can only animate a funct'ional body, i.e. 
one which has the essential organs for ani-
mation, for life; and that requires that the 
body still retain those of -its organs which 
are required for animation. Hence if it 
lacks the brain or the heart 'it is not in a 
state to be animated by a soul. If these 
essentia'l parts are lacking, even though 
there is still some movement, artificial or 
otherwise,in other parts, the body as such 
is dead and the soul will not animate it. 
Clinical death is now generally ac-
cepted as 'identifiable w'ith brain-death, 
and the electrocephalograph is the stand-
ard instrument to detect it. But even here 
one may safely ask: Is this absolutely 
safe? Indeed, a barbiturate dose may result 
in a flat EEG for four hours or more, and 
nobody wHl call that death. We might per-
haps define death as the point at which 
the brain ceases to function having reach-
ed a point of no return, i.e. having reached 
a stage when it 'is unable to regain its 
functionality. The electroencephalograph is 
certainly a very helpful instrument for 
establishing that state provided that the 
straight EEG line is not provoked by arti-
ficial agencies, such as the overdose re-
ferred to above. Decomposition of the body 
begun and permanently conbinued certain-
lly 'indicates death, but it is more an indi-
cat~on of a state of death, not of the mo-
ment at which death occurs; and for trans-
plant operations the state of decomposi-
tion may be too late: the surgeon wants 
the organ to be transplanted before de-
composition begins. 
The case of transplants from human 
beings who are still alive raises greater 
problems. If what is taken from the donor 
destroys or sub stanDi ally impairs the bio-
logical functional'ity of the organism, pro-
voking death, then or later, the excision 
'is not moraNy allowed, because it amounts 
to murder if the donor is not wHling, and 
to suicide if he is willing, since man has 
only the use, not the ownership of h'is own 
body. This has always been the teaching 
of the Catholic Church, and Pius XII con-
firmed it in the address quoted. These are 
his words: "As regards the patient, he is 
not the absolute owner of his own body 
and of his soul. He may not therefore free-
ly dispose of himself as he pleases or fan-
cies ... the patient is subject to the Theo-
logy which fol·lows :from nature; he has the 
right to make use of h'is body, limited by 
the natural scope of the faculty itself, .. 
and because he has the right of use, he is 
not the owner, he has not an unlimited 
right to accomplish acts of destruction or 
of mutilation of an anatomical or a func-
tional character." 
If what is taken from the donor does 
not destroy or substantiaUy impair the bio-
:Jogical and functiona!l integrity of the or-
ganism one should distinguish. If what is 
taken is minimal and clearly does not in-
volve mutilation in the strict sense of the 
word, and, besides, does not impair one's 
health, e.g. a smaU bone, a small piece of 
skin, a blood transfus'ion or the like, there 
is no moral prohibition <whatever. But 
theologians are divided in their opinion of 
the moral correctness of the act if what 
is excised is a whole organ {one, which, 
if single, does not provoke death 1f ex-
cised, e.g. the uterus; or both of a pair if 
they do not provoke death when e:x:cised, 
e.g. both ovaries; or one of a pair, e.g. a 
cornea, a kidney, etc.). 
Some theologians consider such an 
excision as always immoral since, in their 
view, 'it runs counter to God's ownersh'ip 
of the human body. They think that every 
mutilation is a violation of biological integ-
rity, and they appea'l to the maxim "non 
sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona" 
(what is evil may not be done for the sake 
of a good purpose). Furthermore they re-
fer to the statement of Pope Pius XII 
quoted above and to the encyclical Casti 
Connubii, paragraph 24 (30th Dec. 1930) 
of Pope Pius XI which reads as follows: 
"Christian doctrine establishes, and the 
light of human reason makes it most clear, 
that private individuals have no power 
over the members of their bodies beyond 
that which pertains to the'ir natural ends; 
and they are not free to destroy or muti-
late their members, or in any other way 
render themselves unfit for their natural 
functions except when no other provision 
can be made for the good of the whole 
body." TheO'logians quoted as holding this 
view are L. Bender, Organorum humano-
rum transplantatio, in Angelicum, XXXI 
(1954); Il trapianto di un membro dal pun-
to di vista morale, in Perfice Munus, (Apri-
le, 1955); T. Goffi, Moralita del trapianto 
di un membro umano, in Rivista del Clero 
ItQJliano (1954); idem (1955); G. Borg, Del 
trapianto di un membro, in Perfice Munus 
(Marzo, 1955); <F. Regatillo-M. Za<lba, 
Theolaigiae Moralis Summa (1953), Vol. 
II, n. 252; F. Hurth, De re matrimoniali, 
(1955). 
Another group of theolog'ians, while 
accepting that mutilation is illicit, are of 
the opinion that there can be exceptions 
"when God is expected to be wiNing", and 
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they hold that God may be considered to 
to be wiNing when the excision is done 
for the noble mofive of charity, taking, 
of 'course, account of due proportions. The 
unity of the human race in the brother-
hood of creation and of Redemption would 
be the justification of the charity motive. 
Prominent theologians holding this view 
are A. Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis 
Principia, 1945, Vol. Il, N. 299; P. Bongio-
vanni Trapianto di un organo, in Perfice 
Munus (dic. 1954); A. Gemelli, Sulla liceita 
di cedere un organo per il trapianto omo-
plastico, in La Scuola Cattolica, 1934; 
D. Gennaro, Casus conScientiae, :in Per-
fice Munus (Aprile, 1955). 
Still another group of theologians 
who accept that mutilation, if considered 
in itself, is immoral, but who allow trans-
plants of one of a pair of organs, redefine 
mutilation. They hold that by mutilation 
should be meant not the excis'ion of an 
organ, but the destruct'ion of its function-
aHty. In their view, if an organ was ex-
cised in such a way that it remained alive 
and functioning, and hence, when graft-
ed, continued to function, biologicaHy, as 
newly grafted, one could not speak of 
mUfilation. Apart from charity motives as 
'in the precedent theory, they quote in 
their favour the Casti Connubii passage 
of Pius Xl already mentioned, They con-
tend that from the Pope's words one can 
gather that bodily organs are given to man 
for their natural end, i.e. for a definite 
biological pur'pose, and the words "or in 
any other way" equate the word "muti-
lat'ion" with "unfitness for their (the or-
gans') natura:l functions". Hence, these 
theologians think .it is immateria,l on 
which body the organs function as long 
as they continue to function properly 
(given always a good reason - the mo-
tive of charity - and taking care of due 
proportions). Holders of this view are 
L. Babbin'i, Il trapianto delle ghiandole 
alia luce della morale, in Palestra del 
Clero, 1950; L. Screm~n, Dizionario di mo-
rale professionale per i medici, 1953; and 
the already quoted Bongiovanni and 
Gennaro. 
Lastly, another group of theologians, 
and quite a large one, holds that mutila-
tionis in 'itself not bad and illicit, but 
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simply morally indifferent. They contend 
that if man may offer his life for the good, 
spiritual or material (duly proportionate) 
of others, why not also an organ of his 
body if this does not provoke death? They 
quote Our Lord's words (John, 15, 13): 
"Greater love than this no man hath, that 
a man lay down his Ufe for his ffiends." 
The Church has canonised Fr. Kolbe for 
giving his life to save a family man (from 
motives of divine and human charity, of 
course, which Fr. Cunningham expresses 
in terms of the unity of men in the mys-
Hcal body of Christ). The execution of 
condemned murderers by public author-
ity can only he moraHy aUowed 'because 
it is presumed that "God 'is wil'ling" and 
because the taking of life is not of its own 
nature (ex na,tura sua) bad, otherwise God 
would not be able to allow it. Some mo-
ralists ,among them St. Alphonsusde Li-
guori (whom the Church has made the 
patron saint of Moral Theologians), have 
not deemed 'it possible, morally, to con-
demn castration carried out with the ob-
ject of keeping a childlike voice. Even 
granting that man is not the owner of his 
body, yet he is its good administrator. 
This allows him to beat his body even to 
the shedding of bIood and to deny it 
nourishing food for 1lhe spiritual purpose 
of se'1f-chastisement and self-denial, and 
it also allows him to accept some mutila-
tion and to dispose of some organs for 
the spiritual and material benefits of him-
self and of his fellow men. The bio'logical 
integrity of one's body is not SUbstantial-
ly impaired since fhe excision of one of 
a pair of organs does not 'involve death 
or HI-health, and the excised organ ful-
fills what might be caHed a secondary 
natural function in its new body without 
defeat:ing its primary purpose which was 
the good of one's own body. 
Papa'l pronouncements should be in-
terpreted within the framework and con-
text of the purpose and occasion of their 
delivery. In Casti Connubii Pius XI was 
referring to the sternisation laws pro-
posed by Hitler and had no intention of 
referring to transplants, apart from other 
considerations of interpretation as above. 
Pius XII was referfing to the same meth-
ods by which a cure was being sought to 
mcdadies of the nervous system (of a men-
tal nature) by the suppression, even tem-
porarily, of personal liberty or by the 
excitement of sexual instincts. Pius XII 
does not say that man has no power 
whatever of mutilation, but, on the con-
trary, he says uhat man has not an unlim-
ited power of mutilation. Hence, :it fol-
lows, that, albeit limited, he does have 
some power of mutilation in terms of the 
anatomical and functional characteristics 
of his organs. All of it makes it clear that 
the Pope was speaking of substantial, not 
absolute integrity of the body's biological 
functioning. As a result Of these conside-
rations these theologians formulate their 
argument in the "double effect" f.orm: 
from mutilation which is morally indiffe-
rent, two effects follow independently, 
the positive one which is to save life, and 
the negative one, the justifiable loss .of a 
member of the body. 
This last theory has been upheld by 
many theologians right to the present 
day. We mention B. J. Cunningham, C.M. 
(The Morality of Organic Transplantation, 
Washington, 1944); G. Kelly S.J. (Notes 
on Moral Theology, 1946; The Morality 
of Organ Transplantation, in TheoIogical 
Studies, VIE, 1947, and in XI, 1948); "Pre-
serving Life" 'in Linacre Quarterly, Feb. 
1957); MoCarthy, (The Morality of Orga-
nic Transplantation, in Irish Ecclesiasti-
cal Record, Vol. 67, 1946); J. Connery, 
(The Morality of Organ Transplantation, 
in Theological Studies, XV, 1954); J. Pe-
reda (La Mutilacion y el transplante de 
organos, in Estudios de Deuste, julio-
d'iciembre, 1954); M. V. Murray, (Prob-
,lems in Conduct, N. York, 1963); J. J. 
Lynch, (Ethical Implications of Renal 
Transplants, in J. Amer. Med. Assn., 
April, 1967; Ethics of the Heart Trans-
plant, in America, Feb. 1968); c. Curran, 
(The Morality of Human Transplants, in 
The Sign, Maroh 1968); B. A. PapareUa, 
(Moral Principles ~pplicable to Organ 
Transplantation, in Linacre Quarterly, 
Nov. 1968). Since the Church has not con-
demned these views (of this last and 
fourth group of theologians) expressed 
after, and in interpretation of Pope Pius 
XII's statement, and as the arguments ad-
vanced command attention, their opinion 
is probable enough to be safely followed, 
from the moral point of view, at any rate 
until the positiqn is definitely clarified. 
Thus Fr. Lynch (op. cit.) writes: "No one 
is required to acknowledge as oblIgatory 
a prohib:tion whioh is at best objectively 
doubtful. In other words, no theologian 
could legitimately accuse of moral wrong 
doing the physician who involves himself 
professionally 'in organic transplantation 
wi1!h due regard for those precautions 
which sound medical sense would pres-
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cribe for that procedure. Or to put it more 
precisely ... the doctor, who in his pru-
dence seeks to preserve human life by 
means of organic transplantation, can 
merit no less theologica1lly than he does 
scientifically, and Fr. Curran (op. cit.) says: 
"The general principle would be that one 
has adm~inistrative power over one's own 
body, and that, provided he does not ap-
preciably maim himself or lay himself open 
to the risk of personal injury, he can give 
what he has to help someone else." 
SOME M~L TESE PHARMACISTS OF THE PAST 
JOSEPH BORG 
I<.M., Ph.C., L.P., F.R.S.H., F.lnst.Pet. 
Senior Customs Analyst. 
In En:gland pharmacy has been for 
centuries praotised as an art by ·itself. In 
1180 a "Guild of Pepperers or Spicers" 
already existed. In 1345 pharmacists 
formed a separate section of the Grocers' 
Company and in 1671 the "Worsh'ipful 
Society of Apothecaries" was founded and 
received .a charter from King James 1. A 
Royal Apothecary probably existed since 
the days of William the Conqueror and 
certainly officially since the reign of King 
John, his duties consisting in compounding 
medicines for the Royal household, pro-
viding the palaces with the necessary 
wine, spices, drugs and perfumes, .and 
eventually embalming his employers. 
In Malta until late in the period of 
the Order of St. John pharmacy was prac-
tised as part and parcel of the art of medi-
cine and often by the knights themselves 
in their large .and celebrated hospital. The 
name of Pharmacist Chevalier Anthony de 
Lande appears in the records as one who, 
together with officials of Monsignor 
Dominic Petrucci (the Inquisitor-General 
who was in Malta from 1579 to 1581) and 
some knights had been mal'iciously report-
ed to Grand Master de La Cassiere as hav-
ing accepted a proposal to prepare a 
poisonous potion for him. The charge had 
been made by Impellizeri, a Sicilian Who 
had been banished from Malta by the 
Inquisitor. La Cassiere ordered the im-
prisonment of the plotters in Fort St. An-
gelo from where they were freed when 'it 
was discovered that the Sicilian had fabri-
cated the whole story in the hope that his 
previous sentence of perpetual banishment 
would be abrogated. 
Here are some pharmacists of the 
past in Malta, such as could with difficulty 
be discovered. 
Stanislas Gatt (1744-1811) had a 
pharmacy at Qormi near the small church 
of St. Peter's in the centre of the small 
town. He obtained the d'iploma of "Aroma-
tario" from the Chief Physician or Proto-
medico of the Sacred Infirmary of the 
Order on the 13th April 1771 (Arch No. 
1192, Section 86/97) during the grand-
